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Coordination of Facts and Wills
By DAviD L. SAums*
FOR many years Mr. Robert W Harrison, a very fine gentleman and
an excellent lawyer and professor of law at Hastings College of the
Law, emphasized, "You cannot know your law until you know your
facts That is to say, you cannot know what principle of law to apply
until you know the facts to which an application of a principle of law
is required." Tins is one of the most important legal principles en-
countered by this writer in some 34 years spent m pursuit of a legal
education.
This article will demonstrate that the above principle applies as
fully to the drafting of wills as to any other phase of practice. No mat-
ter how carefully a will may be drawn, if there is a lack of rapport
between the instrument and the factual situation of the client, there
will be a poor result.
Joint Tenancy
Probably the most commonly mentioned form of testamentary
frustration involves joint tenancy There are few practitioners who
have not encountered instances where the intent of a testator failed,
at least in part, because of the latter's ignorance of the survivorship
aspects of joint tenancy or his failure to realize that title was held in
joint tenancy
It may not be practical for counsel to insist on the privilege of
examining deeds or other evidence of title m each instance, although
this seems the best procedure. It is certainly appropriate, however, to
point out to clients the importance of determining whether or not
title is held with another as joint tenants and to investigate the accu-
racy of his reply insofar as possible.
Aside from the unforttmate aspect of having property pass into
unintended hands because of the survivorship attribute of joint ten-
ancy, there are at least two tax aspects to be kept in mind when de-
terminig whether or not that form of ownership is appropriate. These
will apply even if the surviving joint tenant is the person intended to
be benefitted.
One of the most common forms of "estate planning" involves having
the testator leave a testamentary trust for the benefit of his or her
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surviving spouse so as to avoid a second tax at the death of that spouse.
For example, if spouses H and W have a combined net estate of
$200,000 in accumulations of community property earnings and invest-
ments, or if each has separate property with net worth of $100,000, the
combined federal estate taxes on the two deaths can be reduced to
less than $10,000 if the first spouse to die leaves his or her community
share, or separate property estate, to a testamentary trust for the benefit
-of the survivor, with remainder interests to vest in their children at
the death of the survivor.1 On the other hand, if the first decedents
share passes to the survivor outright and free of trust, whether because
of joint tenancy, intestacy or the provisions of the will of the decedent,
the total federal taxes on the two deaths will amount to $37,500.2
Of course, the provisions of the decedent's will purporting to create
a testamentary trust for the benefit of the survivor will be of no avail
if the parties hold their assets as joint tenants. While one still hears
comments from laymen to the effect that community property can be
-held in ]omt tenancy, the fact remains that they are two different
forms of ownershp.-Despite the statements in Tomazer v. Tomarer4 and
1 The Federal estate tax on $100,000 is $4,800. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2001.
The assets which the first decedent leaves in trust will neither increase the size of the
taxable estate of the survivor nor be subject to a tax a second time at the death of the
survivor, unless the latter has an unlimited power of appointment over the principal
trust assets and can consume them.
A similar result will follow if the first decdent's net estate has value of $200,000
in separate property and the survivor has nothing. Since the first decedent can leave
-a mantal deduction share to the survivor, the result is the same as above. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 2056.
2 In addition to the tax of $4,800 on the first death, if a net value of $200,000 re-
mares at the time of the second death, the Federal estate tax will be $32,700 less a
possible small credit under INT. Rv. CoDE OF 1954, § 2013 if both deaths occur within
ten years. This credit cannot exceed the amount of the tax paid at the first death, may
be less, and diminishes according to the number of years elapsing betwen the two deaths.
The figures indicated include credit for state death taxes up to $1,200 in connection
with the second death under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2011, but the credit is usually
smaller than the full amount of the state death tax. See CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE: §§
13307-10, 13404-07, showing that in California the tax depends on the number of de-
visees and legatees, their relationship to the decedent, and the amount which each
devisee and legatee receives, rather than on the size of the estate. If the California
Inheritance Tax is smaller than the maximum allowable credit a Califorma Estate Tax
makes up the difference, so as to assure that the state gets the maximum amount allowed
by the INT. BEV. CODE OF 1954. CAL. REv. & TAx. CoDE §§ 13441-43.
3 In Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal. 2d 754, 758, 146 P.2d 905, 907 (1944) the court
stated, "If the evidence establishes that the property is held as community property,
however, it cannot also be held in, joint -tenancy, for certain incidents of the latter
would be inconsistent with the incidents of community property." See also 4 Wrr=,
CAIwFoRNIA LAW, CoMsiNru rrr POPERTY § 34, at 2738 (7th ed. 1960).
423 Cal. 2d 754, 146 P.2d 905 (1944).
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subsequent decisions to the effect that the record title may be over-
come by evidence of the community property ownership, the fact re-
mains that such evidence is necessary to overcome the presumption
that the record title means lust what it says.5
Joint tenancy can actually increase taxes unnecessarily With cer-
tam important exceptions concerning transfers between spouses' the
Internal Revenue Code provides that a transfer of separate property
into joint tenancy constitutes a taxable gift.7 Thus, for example, if a
parent uses separate property funds to purchase $30,000 worth of
securities in the names of a child and himself as joint tenants, the
parent is making a gift to the child of $15,000.8 Whether a tax results
from such a gift depends upon the extent of prior gifts in the case of
the federal tax law However, it should be noted that a state tax
will often be incurred even though the sum of all past gifts is too small
to involve a tax under the federal law 9 Too often one hears the federal
5 Estate of Bagliom, 65 A.C. 189, 192, 53 Cal. Rptr. 139, 142, 417 P.2d 683, 686
(1966).
6Where joint tenancies or tenancies by the entirety involving real property are
created by spouses after 1954, no gifts are involved, even though the contributions of
the spouses are unequal, unless a timely election is filed for the year of acquisition, by
wich the spouses state an intent to make a gift. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2515(a).
In the absence of such election, a gift is created at the time of dissolution of the joint
tenancy if the parties share the proceeds in different proportions than they contributed
to its acquisition. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2515(b). See also Treas. Beg. § 25.2515-1
(1958). Under Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) (4) (1958), if A creates a jomt bank account
for himself and B, or purchases an U.S. Savings Bond payable to "A or B", there is
no gift at the time of this action. There is, however, a resulting gift to B when B draws
upon the bank account or surrenders the bond for cash, without any obligation to account
for the proceds to A. California gift tax provisions are to the same effect. CAL. REv. &
TAx. CODE § 15104.5; Cal. Gift Tax Beg. § 15104(e) (1966).
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2511. See also Treas. Beg. § 25.2511-1(h) (5) (1958).
Note CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 15104 to the same effect.
8 Treas. Reg. §'25.2511-1(h)(5) (1958). If the gift is made to a spouse rather
than to a child, the amount is reduced for gift tax purposes by reason of the Marital
Deduction provisions of the Gift Tax. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2523. However, there
is no sunilar Marital Deduction in connection with the gift tax laws of California.
) Thus, m California, gift tax would have to be paid on the figures given in the
example. The amount would depend upon whether the child was an adult (entitled to
only a $5,000 lifetime exemption) or a minor (entitled to a $12,000 lifetime exemption).
CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 15421. Except for the exemption for gifts to minor children,
there are no specific exemptions (equivalent to lifetime exemptions under INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954 § 2521) in excess of $5,000, and even these lesser exemptions apply
only to a spouse, ancestor or descendant of the donor. The specific exemptions become
smaller as the relationsip becomes more distant. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 15421-24.
So, although the annual exclusion is $4,000 under the California law, CAL. REv. & TA X
CODE § 15401, rather than the $3,000 allowed under the Federal law, gifts become
taxable at a much lower figure in connection with the California Gift Tax law than in
connection with the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
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law stated to the effect that $3,000 a year can be given to each donee
"without counting" and, in addition, each donor has a $30,000 lifetime
exemption, without any warning that smaller sums may mcure state
gift taxes.
It should also be noted that payment of a gift tax will not prevent
death taxes from becoming payable later at death of a joint tenant' 0
The estate tax provisions state that upon the death of a joint tenant
the entire value of the property held in joint tenancy will be includible
in the estate of the decedent, except that property originally belonging
to the survivor which was not received or acquired from the decedent
for less than full consideration." Using the figures mentioned above,
note that on the death of the parent the entire value of the property
placed in joint tenancy will be considered part of the parent's estate
for death tax purposes, in spite of the fact that a gift tax may have
been paid on half of the value of the property at the time of its transfer
to joint tenancy 12
The point is, of course, that the combination of the gift in joint
tenancy and the survivorship at the death of the parent have resulted
in imposition of both gift and death taxes. The gift tax would have
been eliminated entirely and the death taxes would not have been in-
creased had the parent retained ownersip until death. Similarly, if
the parent had made the child a tenant in common or had caused half
of the stock to be placed in the child's name as separate property, re-
taming the other half in the parent's name as separate property, there
would have been no increase in the gift tax over the joint tenancy
situation, and at the parent's death only his one-half would have con-
stituted a part of his taxable estate.13 There is small comfort in knowing
1o See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2040. United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363
(1939) upheld the constitutionality of estate tax on death of a joint tenant, even though
the interests of the surviving joint tenants were vested by gifts from decedent prior to
adoption of the Tax Act.
1 1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2040. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 13671 is to the same
effect.
12 However, if the joint tenants are husband and wife, a deduction is allowed by
both the United States and California death taxes for the surviving spouse's "marital
deduction" share if the source of the property was originally the decedents separate
property and was never community property. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 2056(c) 2
(B). CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 13805 is to the same effect, but refers to an "exemption"
rather than a "deduction" because an inheritance tax rather than an estate tax is involved.
Is This is assuming that the transfer was not in contemplation of death within the
meaning of Irr. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 2035. Furthermore, the parent could have be-
queathed half of is stock to his wife free of tax by qualifying for the marital deduction
of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056. The same results would have followed from a switch
to community property except that there would have been no marital deduction at
the death of the donor. However, in the community property situation both "halves"
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that if, in the original example, the donee had died first, the donor
would not have had to pay a tax on return of the decedent's share to
him by reason of joint tenancy survival.14
While these situations indicate the dangers of joint tenancy, care
must be taken not to transfer assets out of joint tenancy without an
investigation of possible incurrence of gift tax liability The general
rule is that acquisition of property in ]omt tenancy involves a taxable
gift if the separate property fuds of one of the joint tenants are used
to pay for the assets in question. As previously indicated, there are
exceptions, however, where separate funds of one spouse have been
used since adoption of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to purchase
real property in the names of the spouses as joint tenants or tenants by
the entirety 5 No taxable gift is involved at creation of the joint tenancy
unless a timely election is filed, but upon inter vivos termination of
the joint tenancy, if the property or proceeds are distributed in differ-
ent proportions than those by which the parties contributed to the
cost of acquisition, taxable gifts result.' 6 Thus, before any transfers out
of joint tenancy to another form of ownership can be properly advised,
an investigation of the background is necessary If real property held
by the spouses as joint tenants was acquired with separate property
funds of one spouse prior to 1955, a gift was made at the time of acqu-
isition and there will be no further gift upon transfer of title from joint
tenancy to tenancy in common or community property On the other
hand, if real property was acquired after 1954, further investigation
must be made to determine whether or not the parties "elected" to
treat the joint tenancy acquisition as a gift for the year in which the
property was acquired.' 7 Similarly, where joint bank accounts or jointly
held government savings bonds are involved, an investigation should
be made as to the source of the funds deposited or used in purchase
of the bonds to determine whether or not a gift would be involved in
a change of title and, if so, whether or not the gift would be large
enough to create an objectionable tax.'8
would have received a "stepped-up" basis instead of merely the decedent's half receiving
such an increase in basis--assuming that decedents cost would have been no less than
the value at death. INT. RL V. CoDE OF 1954, § 1014(b) 6.
'
4 Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(c) (1958).
15 See note 5, supra, and note that where real property joint tenancies or tenancies
by the entirety are involved in connection with holdings of spouses, the taxpayer has
an election as to whether or not to treat the transaction as constituting a gift.
26Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2515-1(d)(1) (1958), 25.2511-1(h)(5) (1958). To a similar
effect is CAL. REV. & TAX. CoDE § 15104.5.
37 Treas. Reg. 25.2515-1(b) (1958).
18 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) (4) (1958). These instances differ from those where
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Needless to say, there are many instances where joint tenancy may
be advisable. If the estates of a married couple are small enough for
death taxes to create less of a financial problem than probate expenses
and the delays resulting from probate, it is quite possible that joint
tenancy will continue to be the boon which it has often been in the
past. Under such circumstances, wills are needed only to provide for
disposition of the estate in question at death of the survivor.
Insurance and Other Contract Payments Made
Outside of Probate
Quite often a testamentary plan evidenced in a will can be frus-
trated by failure to realize that a substantial part of the estate in ques-
tion consists of life insurance.. We have previously considered the- tax
economies possible where the combined assets of spouses have a value
of $200,000 and each spouse executes a will providing a testamentary
trust of the decedents one-half for the benefit of the survivor. How-
ever, in many instances, although the wills set forth this intent, there
is a failure to note that the wife is named as primary beneficiary of all
the life insurance and that there is little left to be disposed of by the
will. If she survives the husband, the possible tax savings will be dis-
sipated unless this is remedied, for at least "husband's half' of the
insurance proceeds will swell the wife's taxable estate and will be
taxed a second time at her later death unless spent or disposed of
through gifts."'
Similar treatment is applicable with regard to contract payments
to be made outside of probate and to named beneficiaries under non-
real property joint tenancies or tenancies by the entirety are created between spouses,
since there is no opportunity to "elect" to treat the creation of the co-ownership tenancy
as giving rise to gift tax.
19 For example, assume spouses own insurance on husband's life, with maturity
value of $150,000, and other assets having net value of $50,000, and that all insurance
proceeds are paid to wife on husband's death. Even if all other assets feed a testamentary
trust under husband's will, at least $50,000 of life insurance proceeds will be subject
to tax at his death, aside from the $100,000 passing to wife under the marital deduction.
INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 2056. This, added to the $50,000 value of assets going into
trust, would produce an estate tax of $4,800. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2001, 2052.
If the wife dies later, with the entire $150,000 proceeds taxable in her estate, the estate
tax will be $17,900. INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, §§ 2001, 2052. However, if husband had
provided that only half of the insurance proceeds be paid to the wife, and the balance
be fed into the trust under his will, and had similarly divided other assets between
wife and the testamentary trust, it would be possible to leave the taxable estate of
husband at 3100,000, and have only $100,000 balance pass- to wife for taxation at her
later death, unless otherwise disposed of. Each estate would have to pay a Federal tax
of not over $4,800, making the total not over $9,600. INT. tEv. CODE OF 1954, §§
2001, 2052.
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insurance contracts where any substantial amounts are involved. In
this category should be included payments under qualified profit-
sharing and pension plans, as well as payments made at death to mem-
bers of a umon or similar membership organizaton.
A related problem involves insurance policies naming minor chil-
dren as alternate beneficiaries, where the spouse of the insured is
named primary beneficiary In many instances where the combined
assets of spouses have only a modest value, each will want to leave
everything to the other, with a testamentary trust to be created for
the benefit of minor children at the death of the survivor. Such a plan
will avoid the rather cumbersome procedures of guardianships and
will give the trustee broader discretion than that usually given a
guardian. However, it must be remembered that, in addition to pro-
viding for the testamentary trust in the wills of the spouses, the insur-
ance policies must be amended to name the testamentary trustee as
alternate beneficiary, to take if the spouse of the insured does not
survive.
Even where the non-insurance assets do not have sufficient value
to warrant use of a testamentary trust, it may be well for a wife to
create a testamentary trust in her will for the purpose of carrying her
community property interest in insurance on her husband's life. Many
people today are able to earn substantial incomes shortly after com-
mencing their careers, and so can afford to carry large amounts of life
insurance before being able to acquire other investment assets. If,
for example, the husband is the bread winner and the insurance is on
his life, the non-insurance community property assets may be so small
that the wife should leave them to her husband outright if she is the
first to die. On the other hand, he may not wish to receive her com-
munity property interest in insurance policies on his life, since this will
be of little value to him unless he anticipates borrowing money against
the insurance policies, or surrendering them for their cash surrender
value. Accordingly, it may be well to have the wife create a testa-
mentary trust for the purpose of holding title to her community prop-
erty share in such policies, so that if the wife predeceases the husband,
at the husband's death the proceeds will escape taxation in his estate
to the extent of that one-half interest. If the above plan is adopted, a
portion of the proceeds may be treated as resulting from gifts in con-
templation of death if the husband has continued to pay all of the
premiums thereafter. However, it will probably be only those pre-
miums paid within three years of the death of the husband that fall
within this doctrine, which is discussed more thoroughly hereafter.
This last arrangement may not be practical with regard to non-msur-
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ance contract obligations, such as the aforementioned profit-sharing
and pension plans, since these do not customarily permit transfer of
ownership at the wife's death, where the husband is the employee
covered by the plan, and he survives.
For many years, insurance companies were reluctant to name
trustees of testamentary trusts as beneficiaries if the testator was
still living at the time the insurance beneficiary clause was issued, be-
cause of the uncertainty of the will remaining in effect at the testator's
death. Accordingly, inter vivos trusts were used so that at the time of
issuing the beneficiary clause, the insurance company would know
that a trust that could be identified in the beneficiary clause was in
existence. Within the past five years, however, insurance companies
have become willing to name trustees of testamentary trusts as bene-
ficiaries even if the testator is still living at the time of issuance of the
beneficiary clause if there, is a proviso in the clause that if no such
trust comes into existence at the death of the testator in question,
the proceeds are to be paid to the executor or admimstrator of the
estate of the testator.
In California there was also a reluctance to name a testamentary
trustee as beneficiary of a life insurance policy because of the conten-
tion of the State Controller's office that proceeds so paid would not
be eligible for the $50,000 exemption from inheritance tax provided
by the California Revenue and Taxation Codes. 0 This point was
settled, however, by Estate of Anderson,21 which held that such pro-
ceeds would be eligible for the exemption if paid to a trustee under
a previously executed will of a living person, if such will were specified
in the beneficiary clause, but would be ineligible for the exemption
if paid to a trustee under a will not designated in the beneficiary
clause.2 Thus, to qualify for the exemption, the client may either create
2 0 Pnor to Estate of Anderson, 238 Cal. App. 2d 214, 45 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1965)
the office of the State Controller contended that if proceeds were paid to a testamentary
trust under the will of the insured, the exemption of $50,000 under CAL. REV. & TAX.
ConE § 13724 would be lost. Calif. Inher. Tax Beg. § 13722 (1959). While the word-
mg of the California Regulation leaves it unclear as to whether all payments to a
testamentary trustee are ineligible for the exemption, or whether the ineligibility applies
only to those payments to a testamentary "trustee who is under a legal obligation to
use the funds to meet the taxes, charges, debts, or expenses legally enforceable against
the insured's estate," the office of the State Controller contended that all amounts paid
to testamentary trustees were ineligible, regardless of how used.
2i236 Cal. App. 2d 214, 45 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1965).
22The Anderson decision reaches this result by arguing that if proceeds are paid
to a designated trustee under an identified and existing will, there is in fact a payment
to an inter vivos trust, but that otherwise the payment is to a testamentary trust. This
is apparently based on the theory that if the will is identified in the insurance beneficiary
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an inter vivos trust to receive a portion of the insurance proceeds or
have such proceeds paid to a trust, the terms of winch are set forth m
his will-albeit an inter vivos trust. In either event, there is an oppor-
tunity to take care of the client who has substantial income and so
is able to carry large amounts of insurance but has not acquired a
proportionately large volume of other investment assets. In such a
case, the beneficiary clause can provide that if the wife is the survivor
she will receive half of the proceeds outright and free of any trust23
with the balance of the proceeds, or all of the proceeds if the wife
does not survive, to be paid to the trustee in question.24
Another example of partial planning involves suggestions that the
spouses own insurance on each other's lives under a cross-insurance
arrangement. In other words, if wife owns the policies insuring the
life of husband and he, in turn, owns the policies insuring her life, it
is suggested that on the death of either of them, the insurance on the
life of that decedent will escape death taxes because the decedent
owned "no incidents of ownership."25 Aside from the question con-
sidered hereafter, with regard to the "contemplation of death" doc-
tine where the insured pays the premiums on the policy on ins own
life owned by his spouse, the doctrine may be sound in those states
which do not have community property However, in a community
property state such as Califorma, there will be no presumption that
policies issued in the name of the husband are ins separate property
On the contrary, the presumption is that such policies owned by the
husband are community property, and if the premiums have been
paid with community property earnings, they will be deemed com-
clause as having been previously executed, the trust created by that will is inter vivos
in nature. In other words, the provisions of the testamentary trust under the will of the
decedent-insured are made a part of the insurance beneficiary designation under the
doctrine of "incorporation by reference."
2 3 Wife's community property one-half of the insurance proceeds is not taxed be-
cause it already belongs to her, and if the policy represents separate property of the
husband, she may receive half of the proceeds outright as part of the marital deduction.
INT. Rtv. CODE oF 1954, § 2056.
2 4 In those instances where there is no penalty under state tax law resulting from
the use of testamentary trusts, these may be preferable because of simplicity, lack of
expense in their creation, maintenance or termination inter vivos. While the practices
of corporate trustees are far from uniform, some corporate trustees require an annual
fee for maintenance of an inter vivos trust, even though it contains no assets other than
life insurance policies, others make charges for creating the trusts initially, and some
have a charge for termination of the trust inter vivos mn the event that the trustor has
a change of heart. Questions may anse as to the validity of the passive inter vivos trust,
as noted in note 31, tifra, and related portions of the text, unless great care is taken in
the preparation and execution of the documents.
25 See note 27 infra and accompanying text.
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munity property in the absence of an agreement to the contrary 26
Accordingly, where this device is used, care must be taken to supple-
ment the wills of the parties with an agreement stipulating that the
policies insuring the life of the wife are to be deemed the separate
property of husband, regardless of the fact that community property
funds may be used in making premium payments.
The "contemplation of death" problem must also be considered.
To the extent that funds belonging to the insured are used to pay
premiums on such policies owned by his spouse within three years
of the death of the insured, the Treasury Department argues that these
are "gifts in contemplation of death." Furthermore, the Treasury De-
partment is not satisfied with treating the total amount of the premiums
paid as such gifts, but may insist that the entire proceeds, or at least
that portion attributable to the premium payments made during the
three years preceding death, be considered as the "gift in contempla-
tion of death."2 7 Until the correctness of this has been determined
by the courts, the validity of tis contention may be subject to ques-
tion. Nevertheless, it Would be difficult to justify the subjection of a
client to this unnecessary risk without first warning him of the need
for avoiding it.
As previously indicated, one common plan for testamentary dis-
position involves the creation of an inter vivos trust with the will of
the testator "pouring over" into the inter vivos trust at death of the
testator. This relieves the trustee from accounting to the probate
court during the life of the trust 8 and may also avoid publicity with
regard to the terms of the trust since these need not be spelled out in
the will and need never be made public. While California and several
other states have adopted a "Uniform Testamentary Additions to
Trusts Act,"29 wich greatly liberalizes the rules applying to testa-
mentary pour-overs into inter vivos trusts, there are still many states
where this Uniform Act has not been adopted and where the old trust
26CAL. CIV. CODE § 164; Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(c)-2(b)-(c) (1958).
2 7 Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945). Cf. 4 RABEaN & JoHNsoN,
FEDERL INCOMM, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 61.07(5) (1966 supplement); THE
IRESEARCH INsTIrUTE OF AMIERICA, 4 TAX CooimiNAToR § R-2211.2. See generally RcE,
CALrFoRNiA FAMILY TAX PLANNING (2d ed. 1966).
Each premium payment may constitute a taxable gift, in addition to bringing a
portion of the proceeds into the taxable estate of the person paying the premium for
estate tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(8) (1958).
28 Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 1, 193 P.2d
721 (1948); CALIF. CoNTniNrN EDUCATION OF TnE BA., CALIFOPNIA WiLL DRAFrnx
§§ 4.30-.35 (1965); 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS §§ 54.2-.3 (2d ed. 1956).
29 CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 170-73.
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rules apply In these states, the existence of the trust corpus is essen-
tial to the creation of a valid trust,30 and it would seem quite clear
that the attorney's functions would involve being certain that the trust
was m existence before executing a pour-over will. However, prior
to adoption of the Uniform Act, several representatives of trust com-
panies mentioned instances m which the attorneys had the client
execute the will before-the trust agreement had come into existenee,
in that it had not yet been executed on behalf of the trustee and thus
was invalid.3
Another problem affecting the client's insurance, although not
directly related to the drafting of wills, involves unintended gift tax
liability resulting from someone other than the owner of the policy
being named as beneficiary For example, where a policy insuring
the life of husband names wife as owner but leaves one of their chil-
dren as beneficiary, on the death of the insured husband, wife will be
deemed to have made a taxable gift to the child in the amount of the
insurance proceeds payable to that child. 2
Finally, related to the problem previously considered in connec-
tion with transfers of title out of joint tenancy into other forms of
ownership, are the problems arising where ownership of life insurance
policies is changed. The policies are a form of property and changes
of ownership with regard to them will involve the same gift tax prob-
lems as result from changes of ownership for other types of property
However, where intentional gifts are being considered, insurance
policies have the advantage of being valued at less than their face
values during the life of the insured,33 and so may constitute ideal gifts.
30 1 ScoTt, ThusTs § 54.3, at 379 (2d ed. 1956).
31 A similar set of facts was involved in a recent Ohio case. Knowles v. Knowles,
4 Ohio Misc. 153, 33 Ohio Op. 2d 218, 212 N.E.2d 88 (1965). There, decedent entered
into a trust agreement with his brother and had intended to name hun beneficiary of
decedents insurance policyom 'order to create corpus. However, there was an oversight
and the brother was never named as beneficiary of the policy, with the result that no
trust existed at the time of the testators death. Accordingly, his plan to have his will
pour over into the trust was frustrated.
32 Goodman v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1946); Pleet v. Commissioner,
17 T.C. 77 (1951).3 3 Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6 (1958), as amended, T.D. 6680, 1963-2 CuM. BULL.
419 provides generally the value of an established policy is its interpolated terminal
reserve at the date of the gift, adjusted for the portion of the last premmnm payment
remaining unearned at that date, unless a different value is established by sales of com-
parable contracts. In practice the insurance company will provide the appropriate
figure on request, set forth on U.S. Treasury Form 938 for submission with U.S. Gift
Tax Returns. CCH Fan. EsT. & CiF TAx REP. If 3360.35. Califorma requires a sinilar
statement on its form GT-4. Cal. Gift Tax Reg. §§ 15656(b) 5 (1959), 15656(g) 3
(1959).
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Marital Deduction
More closely related to the drafting of wills are the problems in-
volved in the drafting of marital deduction provisions to meet the
requirements of the estate tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
Much has been written elsewhere"- with regard to the drafting of
provisions designed to transmit the maximum Marital Deduction.
Nothing would be gamed by repeating such coverage here. However,
it is often, and sometimes erroneously assumed, that the maximum
tax benefit will result if the first spouse to die transmits as much value
as possible on a tax free basis to the surviving spouse. It is submitted
that this is not always the case, as, for example, where the surviving
spouse already has a substantial separate property estate or contem-
plates receiving one in the future. We have already considered the
example of the spouses whose combined assets have a value of
$200,000, where all of these assets are community property, and have
seen the tax economies available where the spouse first to die creates
a testamentary trust for the benefit of the survivor. The same principles
prevail where separate property is involved. If husband has a net
estate of $200,000 in separate property and wife has nothing, the use
of the marital deduction will enable husband to leave approximately
$100,0003" to wife, free of tax, while the remaining $100,000, which
is, of course, taxable in his estate, can escape a second tax at wife's
later death if paid to an appropriate trust. The result will be the same
taxwise as if the assets had been held by them as community property
On the other hand, if each of the spouses has a net estate of
$100,000 in separate property, it may be disadvantageous for husband
to use the marital deduction to pass $50,000 to wife free of tax, since
on her later death, she will have an estate of $150,000. In other words,
if husband had left his entire estate of $100,000 in separate property
to a testamentary trust for wife's benefit, there would have been two
estates of $100,000 each and the federal tax on each would amount
to $4,800. But if, instead, he leaves a marital deduction share to her,
84 Mallory, A Report on Revenue Procedure 64-19, U. So. CAL. 1965 TAx INST. 601;
Stevens, How To Draft Marital Deduction Formula Clauses Under New Rev. Proc. 64-19,
20 J. T~xAmois 342 (1964); See CA~xr. CoNTcowIN EDucATox oF Tm BmA, CA.u-
Fon ua Wirm DArn NG §§ 4.30-35 (1965). Standard forms conceived prior to issuance
of Rev. Proc. 64-19 should be reviewed with its provisions in mind.
35 The amount which can pass to a surviving spouse free of tax is 50o of the
"adjusted gross estate" as that term is defined in INT. Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 2056. This
is measured by decedents separate property which was never converted into that from
community property, and after deduction of appropriate portions of amounts allowable
as Estate Tax deductions.
[VoL 18
FACTS AND WILLS
we have a net estate of only $50,000 on the death of husband (after
deducting the marital deduction), and then have a taxable estate of
$150,000 at wife's later death. We have avoided a federal tax at
husband's death, but have increased the tax at wife's death to $17,900.
The adverse tax effect, of course, increases as the figures grow larger,
and also as the disparity increases.
While there is much to be said for the old adage about the respec-
tive values of one bird in the hand as opposed to two in the bush,
there is also considerable merit in anticipating future conditions if
taxes are to be mmnnmized. If we assume that husband has $200,000
separate property and that wife has no substantial amount of property
at the time in question, but that there is strong evidence that she can
reasonably expect to inherit a million dollars from her parents at a
later date, it must be quite obvious that if wife is the survivor, the
total taxes may be increased if husband's will contains a marital deduc-
tion provision for the benefit of wife.
Limitations on Testamentary Powers
Without attempting to give full coverage to the instances in which
there are statutory or public policy restrictions on testamentary dis-
positions, it is submitted that there are at least two instances in which
the draftsman of a will may innocently run afoul of such restrictions
unless a careful investigation is made. One involves the existence of
pretermitted heirs. The other is a related problem involving informa-
tion as to the existence of relatives whose lives result in restrictions
upon charitable dispositions.
Shortly prior to the preparation of this paper, the writer had inter-
viewed a married couple who gave the names and ages of their two
children, explained that each of the spouses wished everything to go
to the survivor of them, but wished a testamentary trust for the benefit
of their children in the event of common disaster. It was only after
an appropriate will had been drawn and discussed in detail that the
wife mentioned apologetically the fact that in addition to the two
children who were the issue of the marriage in question, she had a
daughter by a prior marriage who was living with the child's father.
The mother explained that she certainly did not want this child to
benefit from the will since the child's father was well able to take
care of her and willing to do so. Upon it being pointed out that it
was appropriate to mention the child and show that the failure to
provide for her was intentional, the husband-testator said that he did
not want to do this and thought it would be cruel to cut off the child
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of the prior marrage, although, admittedly, he did not want that child
to get anything.
It is respectfully submitted that little can be done to avoid the
occurrence of this type of situation from time to time. However, the
example may emphasize the importance of making that "good try" at
ascertaining the facts, even from a reluctant client.
Insofar as the limitations on charitable gifts are concerned, those
set forth in the California Probate Code are typical of most jurisdic-
tions."' While there are exceptions to these rules with regard to certain
types of recipients, the rule itself can be circumvented.37 Thus it is
evident that there is a need for investigation when drafting charitable
devises and bequests. Often a testator will indicate that he has "no
family" and desires to leave more than one-third of the estate m ques-
tion to charity, only to concede later that he misunderstood the term
"family "
Related Non-Will Problems
Although not properly within the subject "Wills," there are certain
related -areas of interest which should be considered when discussing
with a client his testamentary wishes. While the client may simply
ask to have a will prepared for him, in most instances he is really inter-
ested in determining that is "affairs will be in order if anything
happens to him." The possibility of avoiding probate altogether, or of
at least mmunlzmg his estate for tax purposes should certainly be
pointed out before final decisions are reached.
An increasingly popular alternative to disposition of assets by will
involves the use of revocable inter vivos trusts. These convement crea-
tures are the subject of an excellent film discussion by Professor James
Casner of Harvard University 8 Without any attempt to duplicate the
3 8 CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 41-43. See CA2ns. CoNxcoiNG EDUCATnON OF THE BAii,
CAns'oiv WmLu DRan'm § 3.19 (1965)" Under § 42 the restriction on charitable
gifts does not apply to devises or bequests in favor of the State of California, counties,
municipalities or political subdivisions or institutions belonging to them, or to any edu-
cational institution exempt from tax under § la of Article XIII or § 10 of Article IX
of the California Constitution. (Non-profit California colleges with a specific reference
to Stanford University.)
S7 Assume a devise or bequest in favor of a charitable institution would be restricted
or banned by CAL. PaoB. CODE §§ 41 or 43, but for a stipulation that if the devise or
bequest is ineffective as to any portion, it shall be deemed to be in favor of an eligible
institution, such as Stanford University, to that extent. The provision will be enforced
in favor of the institution originally named. In other words, because of the valid gift
over to an eligible institution, the relatives named in the Probate Code sections would
not receive anything in any event, and so they cannot bring themselves within the
protection of the sections cited. Estate of Haines, 76 Cal. App. 2d 673, 173 P.2d 693
(1946); Estate of Davis, 74 Cal. App. 2d 357, 168 P.2d 789 (1946).
3 8
c/O Mr. Paul Wolkin, Director, Joint Committee on Continuing Education of
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coverage provided by that film, it should be noted that the use of an
inter vivos trust permits the trustor to avoid probate at death and to
become familiar with the procedures of the trustee, while living, with
an opportunity to change trustee, since the trust is revocable. In addi-
tion to avoiding publicity, expense and delays of probate, during the
trustor's later years administration of his affairs can be provided by
the trustee, although the trustor can control the activities of the trustee
while he wishes to do so and has the necessary ability
Where stock in a closely held corporation constitutes a substantial
part of the estate, issuance of a second class of stock may enable the
client to greatly reduce the size of his estate for tax purposes without
dimimshmg is voting interest in the corporation or, in the alternative,
may enable hun to turn over the running of the business to younger
hands without risking a loss of income through failure to pay
dividends.3"
When a business arrangement for purchase of a decedent's interest
in either a partnership or a corporation sets a price which is the full
amount to be received by the decedent's estate or heirs, it is generally
assumed that these prices will be binding upon the tax authorities
for purposes of estate and inheritance taxes. This is not always the
case. If the decedent's estate is not obligated to sell for the price fixed
by the agreement, that price will not necessarily control as to the
Treasury Department.40 Similarly, if the decedent is not restrained as
to inter vivos sales, the price applying at death will not necessarily
be deemed controlling by the Treasury Department.41
Except as previously noted in connection with the "contemplation
of death" problem, insurance on the life of a decedent is not included
the American Law Institute and American Bar Association, 101 North 33rd Street,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19104.
39 If one class of stock is without voting rights, gifts of this stock will reduce the
taxable estate of the donor, with voting control kept intact through retention df voting
stock. If non-voting preferred stock is retained and the voting common stock is given
to younger members of the family, the donor will be assured of income as long as the
business prospers, regardless of the dividend policies of those in charge of the cor-
poration's management. Hea, Capitalization of The Close Corporation, 34 NoTm_ DAWM
LAw. 335 (1959); Henderson, The Use of Different Classes of Stock in Maintaining
Control in The Close Corporation, N.Y.U. 24TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 531 (1966);
Yoblin, Planning An Effective Gift Tax Program: What To Give and When To Give It,
24 J. TAXATION 355 (1966). If the second class of stock is not issued originally, the
provisions of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 306 must be kept mn mind, to prevent sale of
that stock from producing normal income rather than capital gain or loss. Generally
speaking, however, death will cure the "section 306 stock" status. Henderson, supra.
4OTreas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h), as amended, T.D. 6826, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 367.
See CALiF. CONTNUNMG EDUCATION OF THE BAr, ADVISING CAuronOrw-u BUsMNESs ENTa-
pRISES 911 (1958).
41 See note 40 supra.
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in his estate for Federal Estate Tax purposes unless the decedent
possesses at the time of his death the "incidents of ownership" with
regard to the policy 42 However, this exclusion of the insurance pro-
ceeds will be lost if the decedents executor or estate is the beneficiary
of the policy, a matter which should certainly be investigated when
reviewmg the client's affairs.
Similarly, the value of an annuity or other payment made to a
beneficiary of a deceased employee under an exempt employees' trust
or qualified non-trust annuity plan is excludable from his gross estate,
except for the portion attributable to his own contributions and, for
this purpose, contributions or payments made by the employer or
former employer under a qualifying trust or plan are not considered
to have been contributed by the decedent.4 3 However, here again the
exemption from estate tax is lost if the payments are "receivable by
or for the benefit of the decedents estate."44
A discussion of the possibility of reducing the size of the estate
of a surviving spouse through a grant of power to the testamentary
trustee under the will of the first spouse to die to enter into a private
annuity arrangement with the survivor, and the possibility of reduc-
tion through the use of the "widow's election" device properly belongs
in articles on the drafting of wills." Additionally, the possibility of
4 2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042.
43 INT. BEv. CODE OF 1954, § 2039(c).
44 Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-2(b), as amended, T.D. 6526, 1961-1 Cum. BULL. 402.
CCH PENSION PLAN GUIDE § 3266.
45 If at husband's death his will authorizes his testamentary trustee to acquire
property from the widow in exchange for a promise to have the trust pay her an
annuity for life, and if the amounts involved are determined on an "arm's length"
basis, the transfer by the widow to the trust will not be a transfer with income retained
for life under IN'T. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036, because it will constitute a "bona fide
sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth" as the expression
is used in the code section. At her death the value of the property transferred is no
longer n her estate, but nevertheless remains in the family because it is a part of the
corpus of the trust. In addition, there are certain income tax advantages to the widow
during her life because of current income tax treatment of annuity payments. Fidelity-
Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274, 280 n.8 (1958); INT. Bxv. CODE OF
1954 § 72; Cohen, Drafting Tax Clauses in A Wil--Acqulsition of Surviving Spouses
Interest in An Estate, U. So. CALrF. 1957 TAx INsT. 549, 553; Recent Developments
in The Taxation of Private Annuities, U. So. CALIF. 1964 TAx INsT. 491. To the entent
that the widow must elect to have her community property share pass into the testa-
mentary trust under her husband's will in order for her to benefit from the provisions
of his will with regard to his own half of the community property, she is also deemed
to have received consideration for the transfer. In other words, to the extent of the
value of what she received in exchange for her electing to take under her husband's
will, the value of what she transfers into the trust with income retained for life is re-
duced for purposes of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036. Vardell v. Commissioner, 307
F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1962); Estate of Gregory, 39 T.C. 1012 (1963); Abel, Tax Conse-
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reducing the client's estate through the use of inter vivos private
annuities should not be overlooked.
Separate, Community and Quasi-Community Property
The need for segregating separate property from community
property, and quasi-community property from other forms of separate
property does not necessarily involve problems relating to the drafting
of the will." On the other hand, such segregation may be essential
in determining the sizes of the estates of the spouses and in planning
gifts to reduce taxes.47
The most difficult problems arise where community property has
been co-mingled with separate property, regardless of whether or not
the separate property consists of quasi-community property43
It is, of course, much easier to unscramble the confusion while
both spouses are available to test their memories as to what transpired.
In addition, if the tracing appears to be reasonably accurate, it is
quences of Widow's Election: Stapf and Related Cases, U. So. CAL. 1965 TAx INsT.
585, 595.
46 If wife has nothing but her share of community property, and there is uncertainty
as to the extent of husband's separate property, a marital deduction clause can be in-
serted in husband's will without any harm. If husband thus confirms to wife her one-
half of the community property, leaving to her outright her marital deduction share of
his separate property, and ties up the balance of his estate in a testamentary trust
which will not be taxed at wife's later death, if she is the survivor, the tax results will
be the same, regardless of what portion of the assets is husband's separate property
and what is community property, and regardless.of whether or not a portion of such
assets may constitute quasi-community property.
47 See Marital Deduction supra.
48 The seeming contradiction in referring to quasi-community property as a form
of separate property arises from the fact that quasi-community property was created
by statute in Califorma, for limited purposes only, and is not distinguishable from
other forms of separate property for Federal tax purposes. In other words, the Cali-
forma legislature has seen fit to refer to "quasi-community property" in restricting the
power of a spouse to dispose of separate property acquired in another state, which
would have been community property because of the manner of its acquisition, if the
spouses had been living in Califorma at the time of such acquisition, and has also used
the term in granting some relief as to Califorma Inheritance and Gift Taxes. However,
tls does not give the surviving spouse any interest in such quasi-community property
prior to the death of the original owner, and so there is no exemption from tax under
the Internal Revenue Code, although, of course, such property may qualify for the
Marital Deduction in the same manner and to the same extent as other separate property
of the deceased original owner. See CAL. PnOB. COD. §§ 201.5-.8; CAL. REV. & TAX.
CoDE §§ 13.672, 15.300, 15.301, 15.301.5, 15.302.5, 15.303.5; Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(c)-2
(1958); Forster, et al., Tax, Legal, and Practical Problems Arising from the Way in
Which Title to Property Is Held by Husband and Wife, U. So. CAL. 1966 TAx INsT.
35, 100; Walker, Current Developments in Estate Planning, U. So. CAL. 1962 TAX
INST. 825.
January, 1967]
possible to avoid having the problem compounded in the future
through an agreement by the parties stipulating as to their separate
and community property holdings. Even where an income producing
asset, such as an interest in a business, has been acquired partly with
separate and partly with community funds, or community efforts of
one of the spouses, it may be possible to stipulate that a certain portion
of the increase in the value of the asset is attributable to the efforts
of that spouse, and that other percentages are to be attributed to the
different types of capital invested.
In attempting to learn the status of the holdings of spouses, it is
important to go back to the sources through which assets were ac-
quired, to determine whether or not there may have been taxable gifts
involved in past transactions. Thus, for example, if separate property
assets of one of the spouses were used to acquire securities in the
names of both spouses as joint tenants, the transaction was apparently
taxable for gift tax purposes at the time of the joint tenancy acqunsi-
tion, and no further gifts will be involved in a conversion of the joint
tenancy assets into community property. However, if gift tax returns
were required, regardless of whether or not there was any tax to be
paid at the time of the transaction, there may be a real advantage to
the client in filing returns as soon as possible and attaching to the
returns an affidavit explaining the delay in filing.49
Conclusion
The term "Estate Planning" has fallen into some disrepute because
of the extent to which the phrase is used by nonlawyers in an attempt
to claim professional status for their sales activities. Nevertheless, it
is submitted that sales representatives of life insurance compames,
investment firms, and similar organizations perform valuable services
to their clients when encouraging and helping them to review their
affairs as a whole. On the other hand, an attorney does a disfavor to
his profession and to his client if he merely accepts the client's state-
ment that he washes to have a will drawn up, and fails to investigate
the client's need for considering other aspects of his affairs in order
to protect his family at the time of death, and in order to avoid con-
flicts between the various arrangements involved.
49INT. REV. COnE OF 1954 §§ 6019, 6651; Treas. Reg. § 301.6651(a)(3) (1957).
As a practical matter, the Internal Revenue Service is quite reasonable rn these matters
if the delayed filing of a return is explained by an attached affidavit truthfully setting
forth the taxpayers' prior ignorance of the need for a return, and if the return is filed
voluntarily and prior to any inquiry by the Internal Revenue Service, the penalty is
customarily waived.
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